Frank,
I'd have to go further than what you wrote. I believe the document
should explicitly discuss interactions with DKIM, as that document is in
front of the IESG at this time for approval as a Proposed Standard.
Many modifications to a message will invalidate a DKIM signature. It
may be possible for an OPES agent to resign, but there are implications
there too that should be discussed.
Eliot
Frank Ellermann wrote:
The IESG wrote:
<draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security-02.txt> as an Informational RFC
The "bypass" construct apparently includes what's also known as
"challenge response scheme". If that's the case it's net abuse,
unless the challenge is guaranteed to be sent to the originator.
The only relevant case where that's guaranteed I'm aware of is an
SPF PASS. Even in that case some originators might consider the
challenge as abusive, but at least it's not unsolicited, and they
can stop their communication attempts with such OPES receivers.
But the general case is no SPF PASS, and then the challenge goes
most probably (near 90%) to innocent bystanders.
Frank
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