Olaf,
On Apr 2, 2011, at 1:28 AM, Olaf Kolkman wrote:
[as editor:]
It seems that the high order bit of this discussion circles around the
question on whether it a requirement for the IETF Chair to have a voting
position in order to effectively perform oversight. Once we figured out where
we want to go with that we can think about delegation by the chair vs
appointment by the bodies and the implementation details with respect to the
trust.
For the record, I don't agree with this summary. That is, I still question the
basic assumption in the proposal. We have "running code" in the IASA model and
it appears to work reasonable well. Not perfect, of course. In particular I
think that having the IETF chair, IAB chair, and ISOC president as voting
members of the IAOC (and IETF Trust) has worked very well. It makes them an
active part of decisions the IAOC and IETF Trust are making and helps keep the
IAOC from getting disconnected from the community. It also makes them share
the responsibility for decisions by having their vote be publicly recorded.
I also don't understand what the effect of the proposal is on the IETF Trust.
Currently all IAOC members are members of the IETF Trust. They have to sign a
letter accepting this role. I don't think it can then be delegated.
Your draft focuses on one area (that is, reducing the burden of these
positions), but does not discuss any other aspects of making this change. What
might the negative aspects of delegating this responsibility be? How will this
be dealt with?
Each of the positions (IETF Chair, IAB chair, ISOC President) are different in
the way they are selected and this effects their ability to delegate their
responsibility and who they might delegate it to. For example, the IETF chair
is selected by the NOMCOM and one of his/her responsibilities is to sit on the
IAB, IAOC, and IETF Trust. The IAB chair is selected by the IAB. The ISOC
president is hired by the ISOC Board of Trustees. Consequently, I think the
authority to delegate differs and they should be considered separately.
[as olaf:]
I agree that the IETF chair needs to have a good oversight about what goes on
in the IETF, to a lesser extend it is good that the IAB has that oversight
too (specifically with respect to its chartered responsibilities) but I
wonder if a voting membership is the appropriate instrument.
Why not? It does appear to work.
I believe effective oversight depends on having the appropriate high level
information and having the opportunity to timely inject information that is
needed to steer an outcome. An alternative method for sharing and injecting
is having regular meetings between the I* chairs and the ISOC President/CEO.
I believe that such meetings are much more effective for the parties involved
than being exposed to all details.
Do we really need to have another regular meeting? Would this give the I*
chairs more authority than they have now? Sort of an executive committee.
Would these meetings be public, have votes, have public minutes?
This only an illustration of an instrument, there may be other instruments
for oversight as well. But I do not think the ex-officio membership is the
only method.
It's not perfect but it is the one we have now and it is working. We should
only change it if we are sure that it will improve the overall IASA operation.
I am seriously concerned about the current proposal.
Bob
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