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On Apr 14, 2011, at 9:17 AM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
On 2011-04-14 06:19, Bob Hinden wrote:
Olaf,
On Apr 2, 2011, at 1:28 AM, Olaf Kolkman wrote:
[as editor:]
It seems that the high order bit of this discussion circles
around the question on whether it a requirement for the
IETF Chair to have a voting position in order to
effectively perform oversight. Once we figured out where we
want to go with that we can think about delegation by the
chair vs appointment by the bodies and the implementation
details with respect to the trust.
For the record, I don't agree with this summary. That is, I
still question the basic assumption in the proposal. We have
"running code" in the IASA model and it appears to work
reasonable well. Not perfect, of course. In particular I
think that having the IETF chair, IAB chair, and ISOC
president as voting members of the IAOC (and IETF Trust) has
worked very well. It makes them an active part of decisions
the IAOC and IETF Trust are making and helps keep the IAOC
from getting disconnected from the community. It also makes
them share the responsibility for decisions by having their
vote be publicly recorded.
I agree. I think this responsibility should not be delegated.
It's fundamental to the success of the IETF (and the ISOC for
that matter - the IETF is a major source of ISOC's legitimacy).
The IAOC delegates execution to the IAD etc. - maybe the real
bug is that the IAOC itself needs to delegate more?
I agree the IASA model is working well and I also agree that the chairs have
played an important role.
But I am not convinced that it is the only way to keep the IAOC from getting
disconnected from the community. To turn that argument around: If it is the
case that we need the IAB chair, IETF chair and ISOC president [iChiefs] to
keep the IAOC on track then why do we have NOMCOM appointments? One could
easily argue that the NOMCOM appointments are made to keep the IAOC connected
to the community.
I also do not see why it 'it's fundamental to the success of the IETF'. I do
agree that the iChiefs need to understand what is going on, there is no dispute
about, but I question whether IAOC membership is best and most efficient
instrument.
I also don't understand what the effect of the proposal is on
the IETF Trust. Currently all IAOC members are members of
the IETF Trust. They have to sign a letter accepting this
role. I don't think it can then be delegated.
It can't be delegated. However, a duly approved update to BCP101
can change the definition of the formal membership of the
IAOC, and that would automatically change the membership of
the Trust. An alternative would be a formal change to the Trust
Agreement, but since IANAL, I don't know whether a change to
allow delegation or proxies would be possible under the law of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, where the Trust was established.
I do not want to brush over this important detail. But, let us first figure out
what we want with the IAOC. If there is no consensus on having the iChiefs play
a less involved role then fine tuning the details doesn't make sense. If we
gain consensus then fixing the Trust is doable.
Your draft focuses on one area (that is, reducing the burden
of these positions), but does not discuss any other aspects
of making this change. What might the negative aspects of
delegating this responsibility be? How will this be dealt
with?
Help me out.
The main _potential_ negative aspect is a drop of iChiefs' awareness of what is
going on; and the ability to directly influence decisions.
Each of the positions (IETF Chair, IAB chair, ISOC President)
are different in the way they are selected and this effects
their ability to delegate their responsibility and who they
might delegate it to. For example, the IETF chair is
selected by the NOMCOM and one of his/her responsibilities is
to sit on the IAB, IAOC, and IETF Trust. The IAB chair is
selected by the IAB. The ISOC president is hired by the ISOC
Board of Trustees. Consequently, I think the authority to
delegate differs and they should be considered separately.
I agree, this needs discussion. But lets first see if there is any consensus on
going down the path of getting the iChiefs out day-to-day IAOC business.
[as olaf:]
I agree that the IETF chair needs to have a good oversight
about what goes on in the IETF, to a lesser extend it is
good that the IAB has that oversight too (specifically with
respect to its chartered responsibilities) but I wonder if
a voting membership is the appropriate instrument.
Why not? It does appear to work.
Yes it works. But it consumes a lot of time too. IAOC retreat, meetings at the
IETF, regular tele-chats, participation in sub committees, etc, etc...
We have a responsibility to our leadership to make their jobs scalable and
manageable. We need to have our leadership positions accessible to our peers,
who may not have the support of their company for more than a half time job,
or, not to forget, may not have the support of their families for the travel
and the long evenings with telechats. Being effective in what committees and
meetings one participates in is part of making the job scalable.
The Best Current Practice is that the iChiefs _must_ participate in the IAOC, I
like that _must_ being removed.
I believe effective oversight depends on having the
appropriate high level information and having the
opportunity to timely inject information that is needed to
steer an outcome. An alternative method for sharing and
injecting is having regular meetings between the I* chairs
and the ISOC President/CEO. I believe that such meetings
are much more effective for the parties involved than being
exposed to all details.
Do we really need to have another regular meeting? Would
this give the I* chairs more authority than they have now?
Sort of an executive committee. Would these meetings be
public, have votes, have public minutes?
It is not another meeting, it is replacing a lot of other meetings by one
regular meeting that talks about issues at the right level of detail. Also,
sharing information is not decision making. Russ and I had weekly calls planned
(we didn't have them weekly, but that aside) to share information and
brainstorm about potential issues.
I don't see the 'more authority' argument, not in the context where one argues
for direct votes in order to get effective oversight. I think that having a
weekly iChiefs meeting gives less formal authority and (yes) a bit more
informal authority.
This only an illustration of an instrument, there may be
other instruments for oversight as well. But I do not think
the ex-officio membership is the only method.
It's not perfect but it is the one we have now and it is
working. We should only change it if we are sure that it
will improve the overall IASA operation. I am seriously
concerned about the current proposal.
My question is whether there is any will to pursue a change to the BCP to work
towards removing the _must_. (The Best Current Practice is that the iChiefs
_must_ participate in the IAOC, I like that _must_ being removed.)
I have seen Brian and Bob argue against. And not very many people argue 'for'
- --Olaf
________________________________________________________
Olaf M. Kolkman NLnet Labs
http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
I will start to use a new PGP key (ID 0x3B6AAA64) at the beginning
of May 2011.
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