Glen
Me again.
Just after I posted my last message, I received a post on the ietf-ssh list,
hosted by netbsd.org, and looking through the 'Received: from' headers, as one
does on a wet Saturday morning of a Bank Holiday weekend, there was TLS, used to
submit the message to the server, so even spammers have caught on that TLS
should be used everywhere. End to end?
Tom Petch
----- Original Message -----
From: "t.petch" <daedulus(_at_)btconnect(_dot_)com>
To: "Glen Zorn" <glenzorn(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com>;
<ned+ietf(_at_)mauve(_dot_)mrochek(_dot_)com>
Cc: "IETF Discussion" <ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org>
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2011 10:53 AM
Subject: Re: https
----- Original Message -----
From: "Glen Zorn" <glenzorn(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com>
To: <ned+ietf(_at_)mauve(_dot_)mrochek(_dot_)com>
Cc: "John C Klensin" <john-ietf(_at_)jck(_dot_)com>; "IETF Discussion"
<ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org>
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2011 7:29 AM
Subject: Re: https
On 8/26/2011 11:14 PM, ned+ietf(_at_)mauve(_dot_)mrochek(_dot_)com wrote:
+1. If you want signatures, do them properly. Don't pretend a transfer
protection mechanism covering exactly one hop provides real object
security,
because it doesn't.
I could have sworn that TLS was an e2e mechanism. Maybe you're using
the term "hop" in a manner unfamiliar to me?
Glen
Without a precise context, then e2e can mean anything, from ends of a fibre
link
to ends of a communication between two sentient beings.
On other lists, there is sometimes disagreement as to what TLS is, transport,
application or what. What it is not is a secure channel from application to
application, for that you need channel binding or some such, a problem which a
number of WGs have wrestled with, such as isms for SNMPv3 (which used its own
form of binding for both SSH and TLS between the secure transport and the
application).
I regularly hear, and cringe at, statements in the media that you must check
for
the padlock to know that you are secure.
A) you do not know what cryptography is in use (my local library recently
liked
SSL2 as a default)
B) you do not know where the endpoints of the channel are
TLS and padlocks are often a spurious miasma of security.
Tom Petch
And as for the "encrypt so the really secret stuff doesn't stand out"
argument,
that's fine as long as it doesn't cause inconvenience to anyone. That's
clearly
not the case here. And I'm sorry, the "mistakes were made" notion doesn't
really fly: Certificates aren't a "set it and forget it" thing, so if you
haven't noted expiration dates on someone's to-do list so they can be
updated
before expiration, you're not doing it right.
Isn't "not doing it right" pretty much the definition of "mistake"
(assuming no evil intent)?
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