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Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-06.txt> (Forwarded HTTP Extension) to Proposed Standard

2012-07-10 06:29:01
On Mon, 9 Jul 2012 14:27:49 -0400
Alissa Cooper <acooper(_at_)cdt(_dot_)org> wrote:

(incorporating some responses to 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/apps-discuss/current/msg06599.html as a 
LC comment)

It would be helpful if this document could further motivate the need for 
proxies to generate static obfuscated tokens. These two lines in particular, 
from 6.3 and 8.3, respectively, seem a bit weak:

"The identifiers can
   be randomly generated for each request and do not need to be
   statically assigned to resources."

"When using such tokens, a static token per user would increase the
   possibility for external organizations to track separate users."

Well, I think it gives a good hint to use dynamically assigned tokens.

Is it possible to recommend that generated tokens have limited lifetimes 
(per-request or otherwise), and make the static case the exception?

I guess so.

The first statement above gets at this, but it seems to me that the
middle ground between random generation per request and permanent
unique token is worth emphasizing if there will be proxies that want
to keep per-client identifiers around for some limited amount of time
that isn't forever.

It's also worth noting that the second statement above is equally true for 
statically provisioned client IP addresses.

Also, this statement in 8.3 is not really true and probably better left out:

"Proxies using this extension will preserve the information of a
   direct connection, which has an end-user privacy impact, if the end-
   user or deployer does not know or expect that this is the case."

There can certainly be a privacy impact whether the user or deployer has 
awareness/expectation or not. 

Can you give some proof or at least some arguments for this statement?


Cheers,
 Andreas

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