Some of you may recall me ranting several years ago about the importance of
including anti-surveillance features as mandatory aspects of our protocols.
I seem to recall getting (mostly) politely laughed at ...
Anyhow, there's an article on the topic in Wired right now that hints at
the commercial reasons why service companies MUST build anti-surveillance
into their products in order to maintain market viability -- because their
competitors are going to do it and draw away the users. The same can apply
to our protocol designs.
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/08/stop-clumping-tech-companies-in-with-government-in-the-surveillance-scandals-they-may-be-at-war/
he point I'd like to make is that not only should our protocols be designed
so as to reduce their surveilability, they should also be design to help
other protocols do the same. Encryption, random ports, random packet sizes,
random interpacket timings, multipath, and peer-to-peer with relay support.
Think about it.