On Sep 5, 2013 5:17 PM, "Dean Willis"
<dean(_dot_)willis(_at_)softarmor(_dot_)com> wrote:
This is bigger than the "perpass" list.
I suggested that the surveillance/broken crypto challenge represents
"damage to the Internet". I'm not the only one thinking that way.
I'd like to share the challenge raised by Bruce Schneier in:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying
To quote:
-----------
We need to know how exactly how the NSA and other agencies are subverting
routers, switches, the internet backbone, encryption technologies and cloud
systems. I already have five stories from people like you, and I've just
started collecting. I want 50. There's safety in numbers, and this form of
civil disobedience is the moral thing to do.
Two, we can design. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the internet
to prevent this kind of wholesale spying. We need new techniques to prevent
communications intermediaries from leaking private information.
We can make surveillance expensive again. In particular, we need open
protocols, open implementations, open systems – these will be harder for
the NSA to subvert.
The Internet Engineering Task Force, the group that defines the standards
that make the internet run, has a meeting planned for early November in
Vancouver. This group needs dedicate its next meeting to this task. This is
an emergency, and demands an emergency response.
------------
The gauntlet is in our face. What are we going to do about it?
Is there a standards gap or an implementation gap?
All Tor, all TLS, all PGP, all DANE all the time?
And dont forget about this
http://www.zdnet.com/nokia-hijacks-mobile-browser-traffic-decrypts-https-data-7000009655/
I like this post below, just accept the risk that there is no expectation
of privacy. The snoops have optical taps and all the private keys. And the
T&Cs for most public email services, social networks, maps, hospitals,
airport wifi... make it clear your data is not private.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/our_newfound_fe.html
CB
--
Dean Willis