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Re: Number of CAs

2013-11-18 00:26:24
Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

Not unless you compile your browser from source and verify the source each
time you compile.

Wrong, because your compiler may also be compromised.

        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_%28computing%29

        Thompson's paper describes a modified version of the Unix C
        compiler that would:

                Put an invisible backdoor in the Unix login command
                when it noticed that the login program was being
                compiled, and as a twist

                Also add this feature undetectably to future compiler
                versions upon their compilation as well.

They have demonstrated an ability to hide compromise
pretty well.

See above. I know better than you how to hide it.

Still, I can say open source helps a lot.

It does not deny my point that PKI is no better than DH.

You are conflating the possibility of an attack with the certainty of an
attack succeeding.

Assuming active MITM attacks both on ISP chains and CA chains, the
attacks on PKI always suceed.

Subpoenaing the software providers and the CAs are two different issues.
Google could not credibly claim that its business would be destroyed if
PRISM was exposed but

Are you saying that it's OK even though google's software business
has damaged a lot?

Note that google also has cloud provider business, which is also
damaged a lot.

Symantec could and would make the claim that they
would lose a business unit they paid $1.2 billion for.

Because PKI business is a fallacy, they really don't loss any
real business.

Issuing a bogus certificate is a very visible event.

Assuming active MITM attacks both on ISP chains and CA chains, the
attacks are invisible.

                                                Masataka Ohta