This document says RTP does not need to specify a security mechanisms and
that's OK. Note this document could says you must do A or B depending on the
situation but it does not. It just says it is ok not to specify anything. My
read of the consensus at last plenary was that the IETF had decided it was
going to stop doing that. I don't care about if this draft is published as it
or not as I think this draft will have zero impact to what is deployed. I do
think it is worth us being consistent on what security we expect to have in RFC
going forward.
All I am asking is the IESG be consistent about how they judge consensus on
this and if they decide to publish it, provide some guidance on when they think
it is fine to not have security and when they think it is not fine.
On Dec 6, 2013, at 4:40 AM, Colin Perkins <csp(_at_)csperkins(_dot_)org> wrote:
Cullen,
On 5 Dec 2013, at 16:56, Cullen Jennings (fluffy)
<fluffy(_at_)cisco(_dot_)com> wrote:
Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think this
document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working group, I
doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.
I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each different
scenario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs to
be secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the
requirements are. For something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP
is much better than having many ways.
I'm confused about your objection, since this draft states that we need to do
exactly as you propose.
Colin
--
Colin Perkins
http://csperkins.org/