On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 7:52 PM, Mark Andrews <marka(_at_)isc(_dot_)org> wrote:
In message <CAMm+LwgptxAAmCxqP9g8-+EOjwapwb2PJjVvvSe=
N6A79WZqXA(_at_)mail(_dot_)gmail(_dot_)com>
, Phillip Hallam-Baker writes:
On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 5:54 PM, Doug Barton
<dougb(_at_)dougbarton(_dot_)us> wrote:
On 12/08/2013 09:41 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 9:22 PM, Doug Barton
<dougb(_at_)dougbarton(_dot_)us
<mailto:dougb(_at_)dougbarton(_dot_)us>> wrote:
On 12/08/2013 10:21 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
As I pointed out, what I was objecting to was yet another
iteration of
someone asserting that the DNSSEC PKI is different from the CA
system in
a way that it is not actually different.
So I don't have to fix DNSSEC, all I need to fix here is to
have
David
and others stop making claims for the protocol that are not
supported by
evidence.
Um, no. What you originally asserted was that the root was
vulnerable to being hijacked by an NSL. You have yet to provide
any
evidence of that, and when confronted by evidence to the contrary
you changed the subject.
So leaving aside the fine points of PKI and how they do or do not
relate to the root, do you have _any_ evidence to support your
original assertion?
What I said was that any root management is vulnerable to government
coercion. And that is still obviously true.
So your proof consists of, "Of course I'm right?"
No it consists of the argument that followed but you chose to respond to
before you read it.
Publishing the legit ceremonies might provide some additional
transparency but does not prevent an illegitimate ceremony being
inserted.
Theoretically that's true, sure. But the real question is what
practical
benefit would it have for the coercer? Again I'm asking for you to
outline
the attack you have in mind in detail.
Same as for CA PKI, they can make use of the bogus cert in some closed
network and hope that the network does not reach ground truth and
discover
the attack.
There is however another important attack that is unique to DNSSEC which
is
a denial of signature attack. In the CA system you can always choose
another CA. So a legitimate signing request will always be satisfied by
some CA in some jurisdiction. The risk in DNSSEC is that the ICANN root
signer is coerced publicly to refuse to sign some domain. Congress has
the
power to pass legislation and a future president might claim that they
already have the power.
Which is trivial to work around by adding a TA for the zone in
question. Remember the zone publishes the DNSKEY and DNSSEC is
designed to work with islands of trust. RFC 5011 give a crude
mechanism for following DNSKEY changes.
For a similar reason removal of TLD's can't happen as people can
still graft on namespace and establish TA's for the grafted on
namespace.
It is trivial to fix when the validation is taking place in a service in
the cloud (aka a resolver).
Rather less easy to do if people drink the DANE cool-aid and do the job at
the end point.
Now you can take this point as either arguing against doing DANE or
considering the risk and deploying the appropriate control. But you do have
to consider it.
What you are in effect asserting is that the resolver providers are the
apex of the trust chain and so there is a diffuse trust surface rather than
a sharp point. Which is true when the validation takes place in the
resolver.
--
Website: http://hallambaker.com/