Hello AB,
Thanks for your review.
1- The reviewer suggests that the title to be changed to specify the
type of optimization or its condition. As to chang it to:
An Optimization for the MANET Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)
based on link quality.
Left for authors to respond.
2- The draft mentions in the introduction:-
This modification is strictly optional,
[AB] the reviewer suggests to include in the ID-Abstract that this
standard is optional. It is not enough to only mention in the
introduction such important information.
Good point.
3- The draft proposes to update two IETF standards but does not show
any testings information. It is prefered to test the standard
performance by IETF before published.
"It is preferred" presumably means you would prefer it?
The document shepherd write-up confirms that there are multiple implementations
of this specification. I assume, therefore, that you are suggesting that the
modulus of the optimization be tested. Isn't that obvious, however? You can
quantify this very exactly simply by looking at the protocol exchanges.
4- The draft states:-
As such, this protocol introduces no new security considerations to an
implementation of [RFC6130] or of any other protocol that uses it,
such as RFC7181].
[AB] The standard is based on the use of link quality in such
optimization, however, the proposed standard can be attacked (requires
considerations) if the link quality is attacked frequently. The
proposed choice of the quality-threashold and its acceptance decisions
are very important to the proposed standard to function successfully,
therefore, the reviewer suggests to remove the above text from the
draft and to add some security considerations.
Haven't you got this exactly the wrong way around?
That is, without this optimization, an attack on the stability of the link
(such as by radio interference) can cause disruption to 2-hop neighbors (or at
least to their robustness).
This document makes these neighbors more able to rapidly recover when the link
is restored.
This point was already made by me in my review and in the Sec Dir review by
Charlie Kaufmann and lead one of the authors to propose including a simple
statement that "It may sometimes provide a small improvement in availability
against attacks such as short bursts of deliberate interference" although it
was also discussed that this is not a very substantial security improvement
given that it is a second (or even third) order effect compared to the basic
attack on the link.
Adrian