At 06:10 PM 6/23/2015, joel jaeggli wrote:
On 6/23/15 2:45 PM, Randall Gellens wrote:
At 11:41 AM -0400 6/23/15, John C Klensin wrote:
Just following that logic, could you explain who would have the
power and incentive to manipulate the reported US national debt
in order to affect the IETF Nomcom selection process?
If someone wanted to manipulate the outcome of the Nomcom selection
process, wouldn't there be far easier methods? E.g., stacking the list
of volunteers with individuals over whom the manipulator has influence?
Given that you can highly bias the outcome by ensuring that the
candidate pool is sufficiently small (frequently this involves doing
nothing at all) that seems like a lot of work.
The size of the candidate pool has nothing at all to do with it. It's the
strict proportion of the number of nominees that you control that's the figure
of merit. If you have approximately 30% of the candidate pool, regardless of
the size of the pool, 85% of the time you will have 2 members selected. (This
is a binomial distribution where the value for 2 is the sum of all the
percentages for getting 2,3,...10 members)
Percent of Volunteer Pool vs Chance of having two members
1.0% 0.4%
5.0% 8.6%
10.0% 26.4%
15.0% 45.6%
20.0% 62.4%
25.0% 75.6%
30.0% 85.1%
35.0% 91.4%
Percent of Volunteer Pool vs chance of having 0 members.
1.0% 90.4%
5.0% 59.9%
10.0% 34.9%
15.0% 19.7%
20.0% 10.7%
25.0% 5.6%
30.0% 2.8%
35.0% 1.3%
The figures for getting exactly 1 member are left as an exercise.
The numbers above are a consequence of limiting the number of members from a
single organization rather than limiting the volunteer pool percentages.
Later, Mike