Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-da

> I also think you have higher trust in dnssec-validated keys than a key
> that you get from a key server without a trust path to some key you
> trust.
Not really.  The only credible assertion a self-signature like DNSSEC can 
make is "this is me."  But in this case it's "this is my user" which is 
not the same thing.  Unless you know something about the relationship 
between the domain and its mail users, that might be anywhere from 
completely true to completely false.
If it's false, it doesn't have to be false for malicious reasons.  If I 
ran a webmail service, call it GooHoo, I'd publish keys for all my users. 
Why not?  The opportunistic encryption keeps random strangers from 
snooping on incoming mail, webmail pretty much requires that the mail 
service handle the encryption (there are plugins, but I've never found one 
that was at all usable), and I can continue to enhance the experience of 
my webmail users by displaying relevant ads from our trusted marketing 
partners.
Also, it seems to me that most of the complaints about key servers could 
be fixed by improving the key servers, without having to change the 
existing pgp clients that use them.
R's,
John