Hi,
A few obervations...
--On Monday, February 15, 2016 21:53 -0500 Michael StJohns
<mstjohns(_at_)comcast(_dot_)net> wrote:
On 2/15/2016 7:05 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
The question is, is the IETF Chair in the IAOC as "IETF
Chair", "IESG Chair", or both? John's analysis is quite right
as far as the IESG Chair is concerned. For example, consider
the IAOC's job of overseeing the IAD's job of ensuring that
tools such as the tracker are in good shape. IESG input there
is essential, but it could be conveyed by any Area Director.
However, for some other matters, especially policy matters
handled by the Trust, the IESG has no special role - they are
community matters, where ultimately it's the IETF Chair who
calls consensus.
So I see a case for the IETF Chair being in the IAOC ex
officio as today, and that is*orthogonal* to the question of
an IESG liaison.
The above, to me, is a really strong argument for either
separating the IAOC membership from that of the IETF Trust or
for explicitly changing the IESG so that the IESG Chair and IETF
Chair roles are separated to different people and job
descriptions. Without one of those splits, I think the "three
jobs" discussion conceptually useful but not helpful as an
actual operational model.
I think your analysis is pretty on target. Given the above
and the discussion on the IAB chair I would probably do this:
Have the IAOC consist of
o The IETF Chair (ex-officio)
See above.
o One member of the IESG selected by and from its membership
for a 1 or 2 year term
o One member of the IAB selected by and from its membership
for a 1 or 2 year term
o One member of the ISOC BOT selected by and from its
membership for a minimum 2 year term with an option to extend
year to year.
Mike, I'd like to better understand why you want to eliminate
the ISOC President's presence and responsibility on the iAOC.
Remember that the IASA is an ISOC activity, that the IAD is an
ISOC employee, that the ISOC President and CEO controls the day
to day budgeting and financial chain into which the IASA leads
and, unless we delegate that to an IAOC member and volunteer, is
the direct, line management, reporting chain of the IAD. By
contrast, the function and membership of the ISOC BoT members
are, as I understand it, much more strategic and oversight.
They are selected no more specifically for the skills needed in
IAOC (and the Trust) -- narrow subsets of the IAOC BoT role--
than, e.g., the IAB Chair and do not have any direct operational
responsibilities (for IASA or anything else) as part of their
roles.
o Four members selected by the Nomcom for 2 year terms -
confirmed by both the IAB and IESG (alternately 3 or 6 members
with three year terms)
o The ISOC BOT Chair and the IAB Chair as observers if they
aren't otherwise appointed.
The ISOC BoT Chair is much like the IAB Chair -- selected from
the membership of the BoT with the main formal responsibility,
other than symbolic appearances, being to chair meetings. Not a
substitute for the ISOC President and CEO (again, a professional
with operational and line management responsibilities) at all.
...
The NOMCOM selected members are currently confirmed by the
IESG. If we make the above changes, then we require anyone
appointed by the Nomcom to be acceptable to both the IAB and
IESG, but we take away the IAB and IESG's current appointment
power for the two other at large members. Given that the
IAB, IESG, ISOC and Nomcom are all pulling candidates from
mostly the same pool, it does not make a lot of sense to have
4 different groups appointing at-large members.
In what way do you see ISOC as pulling from the same pool as the
others? The IAB does appoint some members of the BoT, but they
are, if I recall, in a significant minority, few of the other
members are appointed from active IETF participants, and the IAB
has occasionally appointed ISOC BoT members who are no longer
active in the IETF community.
The benefit of staying with the current ex-officio model is to
not have to figure out how to deal with varying term lengths
amongst the ex-officio replacements. But, if you change the
model, then you have to figure out how to give the IAOC *at
least* the same level of stability that it currently has in
membership terms.
Makes sense up to a point. That point involves your assumption
about "stability" in the IAB Chair. It may just be another
reason to get the IAB Chair out of the picture, but, while IAB
Chairs are normally selected for terms that start at the first
IETF meeting of the year, terms have been quite variable, with
some history of Chairs stepping down in the July-September
window in order to better provide for transition and overlap.
Sometimes that has even been the plan when someone agrees to
take the position in circa March. And, of course, that is
independent of "serves at the pleasure of..." and the consequent
potential for mid-term firing (or honored requests to resign).
So, if long-term stability of membership is your goal, you want
the IAB Chair out and, if Brian's implicit suggestion to split
the IETF and IESG Chair roles were adopted, your'd want the IESG
Chair out too.
best,
john