Hi Simon,
Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in our
version 04. Please see my comments inline.
Yours,
Daniel
-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Simon
Friedberger
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM
To: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Cc: tls(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK
with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to
Proposed Standard
Nits:
RFC 4279 reference is missing.
MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the
Normative reference as well as in the introduction at line 127, in section 3
line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know.
"TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and above" or
"TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote:
The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
(tls) to consider the following document:
- 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)'
<draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments
may
be sent to iesg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org instead. In either case, please retain
the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
Abstract
This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on
the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
(ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK
provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
integrity protection.
The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/
No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
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