Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK w

Instead of our in addition to the Wiki, check scholarly references. E.g., 
Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, etc.

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On May 18, 2017, at 17:18, Daniel Migault 
> <daniel(_dot_)migault(_at_)ericsson(_dot_)com> wrote:
>
> Hi, 
>
> Thanks Tim and Uri for the comment. At least wikipedia considers them as 
> equivalent. I am fine either way, but leave it  as pfs unless there is a 
> consensus to change it to forward secrecy. If having fs seems important to 
> you please let us know asap!
>
> Yours, 
> Daniel 
>
> > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL 
> > <uri(_at_)ll(_dot_)mit(_dot_)edu> wrote:
> > It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible.
> >
> > I say leave it in.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Uri
> >
> > Sent from my iPhone
> >
> > > On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson 
> > > <tjackson(_at_)mobileiron(_dot_)com> wrote:
> > >
> > > One small nit.
> > >
> > > > ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy
> > > I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just 
> > > “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach?
> > >
> > > Tim
> > > —
> > > Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc.
> > >
> > > On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" 
> > > <tls-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org on behalf of 
> > > daniel(_dot_)migault(_at_)ericsson(_dot_)com> wrote:
> > >
> > >    Hi Simon,
> > >
> > >    Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in 
> > > our version 04. Please see my comments inline.
> > >
> > >    Yours,
> > >    Daniel
> > >
> > >    -----Original Message-----
> > >    From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Simon 
> > > Friedberger
> > >    Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM
> > >    To: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
> > >    Cc: tls(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
> > >    Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> 
> > > (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer 
> > > Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
> > >
> > >    Nits:
> > >
> > >        RFC 4279 reference is missing.
> > >    MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the 
> > > Normative reference as well  as in the introduction at line 127,  in 
> > > section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us 
> > > know.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >        "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and 
> > > above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
> > >    MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
> > >
> > > >    On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote:
> > > > The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
> > > > (tls) to consider the following document:
> > > > - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
> > > >   Security (TLS)'
> > > >  <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
> > > >
> > > > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> > > > final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> > > > ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, 
> > > > comments may
> > > > be sent to iesg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org instead. In either case, please 
> > > > retain the
> > > > beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> > > >
> > > > Abstract
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >   This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
> > > >   Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  The cipher suites are all based on
> > > >   the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
> > > >   (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
> > > >   with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  PSK
> > > >   provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
> > > >   forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
> > > >   integrity protection.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > The file can be obtained via
> > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
> > > >
> > > > IESG discussion can be tracked via
> > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > > TLS(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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> > >    TLS(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
> > >    https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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> > >
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