Re: a few short notes
2004-02-02 03:56:59
At 23:47 01/02/2004, Jari Arkko wrote:
Martin Duerst wrote:
At 16:56 04/02/01 +0100, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
Mandatory authentication is also a bad idea IMO. Obviously
authentication is very important and must be supported so that people
who only want to receive mail from verifyable sources get to implement
this policy, but that doesn't mean that we should force *everyone* to
use such a policy.
I tend to disagree. *I* don't want you to receive a message that is faked
and pretends to come from me, but doesn't. Even if you don't care, I do.
I would strongly prefer a system that would not allow this. And my gut
feeling is that most users would be with me on this.
I think the hard question is what level of "authentication" to require.
I am pretty sure 99.99% of users want better protection against spoofed
addresses than we currently have. But I am not sure they are willing to
go as far as mandating a global PKI of all e-mail users. So what's left, then?
Just verifying the two domains but not the users?
I think the 'chain of trust' idea comes in. I want to know that the mail
server that sent me a message from 'bill(_at_)microsoft(_dot_)com' actually was
allowed to do that. Then, I want to know that that mail server had checked
who it had got the message from (ideally it has put details of the check it
did into the message's metadata)
Yes, that mail server could fake the authentication details it had
received, but it could be made so it wouldn't be able to fake whether or
not it was allowed to send mail from that address. So, if it was allowed to
send mail from bill(_at_)microsoft(_dot_)com, but it had faked the authentication
details it had received, I would have some confidence in blocking the mail
from that domain, because I know at least that domain hasn't been faked.
The only way for me to know that the original sender IS who (s)he says it
is, is to have a global PKI with a central registry who verifies all users
are who they say they are - which isn't possible.
Having the 'chain of trust' idea is a vast improvement over what we have
now, wouldn't be too hard to implement (IMHO) and would make it a lot more
difficult (if not impossible) for spammers to work in the way they do now.
"All" it would leave would be ISPs who allow quick & easy (& free,
sometimes) sign up without checking their new users' details, and then
allow them to send unlimited emails before their accounts get blocked (if
the ISP goes that far). I don't see any workable way to stop that
particular problem other than by those ISPs acting with more care themselves.
Even that would be easier to work around that it is now as anti-spam
databases could be set up to quickly react to spammer email addresses in
the same way that DNSBLs are set up now for spammer IP addresses, but with
more precision, and more accuracy, since you could *know* that the spammer
email address is authentic.
Paul VPOP3 - Internet Email Server/Gateway
support(_at_)pscs(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk http://www.pscs.co.uk/
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