On Thu, 2004-05-06 at 13:27, Tony Finch wrote:
cam.ac.uk IN TXT v=spf1 pgp -all
cam.ac.uk IN TXT v=spf1 smime -all
cam.ac.uk IN TXT v=spf1 dk -all
The "ses" mechanism we were talking about recently would fit into this
scheme nicely.
Ack... after re-reading your original post, you did say signed sender
addresses. I mis-read and thought you had said signed messages, hence
my examples. But your right, an ses modifier would also fit right into
this scheme, which is exactly why the extensibility of mechanisms was
considered during the design of SPF.
The aim of my post was to point out that SPF should have a way of
specifying different policies for HELO and MAIL FROM.
I agree that they should, unfortunately the discussion for extending the
check to HELO came about after many on the list considered the spec
frozen. Thus, it was added as an optional check and was intended to
have no impact on the frozen spec other than allowing the option.
Had we gotten to that discussion sooner, perhaps some design decisions
could have been made to allow SPF to make the distinction.
--
Dustin D. Trammell
Vulnerability Remediation Alchemist
Citadel Security Software, Inc.
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