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[Chris Drake]
*"screws" = blocks us from forwarding or altering anything on
behalf of senders (in its current spec anyhow)
I agree with you here. I see no reason for the DomainKeys
specification to sign the entire message.
DomainKeys should only sign the headers, including a nonce and a
timestamp to protect against replay. That's all the signing MTA can
really verify in the first place, because it has know idea about
validity the message contents other than that the sender had
permission to send mail as a domain user.
Perhaps they could also have a "end signed part" like the PGP-text
format to enable signed message bodies. I send signed PGP messages to
lists all the time, and it works fine, the signatures are still
verifiable.
Sure, you give up protection against man-in-the-middle attackers
adding attachments and content below the "end signed part", but
ignoring anything like that at the receiving MTA could be specified
in the DomainKeys RFC as well.
Regards,
Ryan
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