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David Maxwell writes:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2003 at 12:45:58PM -0700, Justin Mason wrote:
Brad Knowles writes:
There are human rights workers around the world that have their
lives literally depending upon being able to send anonymous e-mail.
You will literally be responsible for the murder of tens, hundreds,
thousands, maybe millions of people, if you do not account for this
issue.
This is important, I agree.
But IMO, something like the PGP remailers and/or hushmail are the key
systems to support this form of free speech -- it should *not* be part of
the core SMTP protocol. Here's why:
I think there's an important distinction to make between 'Internet
email' and 'messages'.
If the choice is between 'all mail servers are open, and all users must
accept spam' and 'mail servers authenticate connections in some way, and
activists need to create their own infrastructure to get messages out' -
I'll pick the second.
To _whom_ are the activists sending their messages? Are they spamming
them to random recipients, or to known contacts? If to known contacts,
why can't they use encryption to hide the content. If they're spamming
to unconsenting recipients, how is that any different (technically) from
commercial spam?
Exactly -- from what I've seen of it, it's generally to known contacts
(e.g. cryptome, journalists, Amnesty etc.)
- --j.
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