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Re: [Asrg] Re: bounces, and anit-spam principles

2007-01-22 21:48:15
On Tue, 23 Jan 2007 02:36:40 +0000
 Tony Finch <dot(_at_)dotat(_dot_)at> wrote:
<gep2(_at_)terabites(_dot_)com> wrote:

2. Accordingly, the definition of what they do and do not want MUST be such that the RECIPIENT defines it... not the
IETF, not the sender's ISP, not the recipient's ISP, nor
some governmental body, nor anybody else.

Most users prefer to delegate this job. It's 10x more efficient
to do so.

I have no idea where you get that statistic, but looks sorta brown to me.... ;-)

I would be happy to have someone else adjust some of my spam filters for me, as long as the results are good, but my experience with such things is that they simply aren't as good as they need to be... to the point where I had to simply turn some ISP-provided spam filters off (they were more trouble than they were worth, and mis-categorized too many messages).

Another problem with centralized antispam filtering is that spammers get good at tweaking their messages so they manage to get through the widely used filters. It's far harder to do that if individual recipients can set their own message size limits, rejection criteria, and so forth. And of course, finely grained whitelists on a per-recipient/sender pair basis can really only be done by the recipient, since the list of approved senders (and what they are expected to be sending) probably won't be the same for any two recipients.

well-written software implementation can reduce the hassle factor of maintaining such finely-grained whitelists to (IMHO) very reasonable levels.

3.  Systems which rely on the "reputation" or
"certifications" of the (supposed) sender are not very
helpful, because a user's machine can be compromised by a
worm or virus, or because a purported sender's credentials
can be forged.

I'm quite happy with reputation systems that block email
in these situations, because you can't expect to let your machine be compromised without consequences.

OK, so let's say Aunt Matilda's system gets a virus on it, and starts sending out spam (sooner or later, MOST machines will be infected at least once...!) Now what? Game over? Aunt Matilda never manages to succesfully send another E-mail again as long as she lives?

And what about the case where Aunt Matilda's system IS NOT infected, never has been, but where her mail services is impacted (as mine has been) by SOMEONE ELSE's machine being infected, and forging HER return address on the e-mails? (Rather like the bogus way that Yahoo disables valid e-mail addresses for forged mail that OTEHR people have sent?)

Clearly SHE doesn't deserve those "consequences", and since there is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING that she could possibly do about that situation, there is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to be gained by sending "bounce" messages back to her, or otherwise harassing her for something she has NO control over. You're only multiplying the nasty consequences of the spamming or worm infection.

They also deal
with the vast majority of spam very cheaply.

"Cheaply" isn't necessarily "well". We've already discussed how I might occasionally send an E-mail message from an Internet cafe in a resort city, or for that matter onboard a cruise ship. I will still want to use MY personal E-mail address, even though it will not be being sent out by anything remotely like the E-mail servers I would use from my systems here at home. Blocking those messages as "spam" just because they aren't being sent through my habitual mail server (and I may not know in advance whose server that Internet cafe is using) isn't very helpful.

We programmers have the saying that "things should be made as simple as possible, BUT NO SIMPLER!" A cheap solution that doesn't work (at all) for a significant number (even though small, percentage wise) of legitimate users isn't a viable or attractive solution, no matter how cheap it might be for those cases where it works.

Tony.


Gordon Peterson
http://personal.terabites.com

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