Stephen,
I'm sorry for contributing more heat than light to this conversation.
And to answer Dave's question: I was not calling DKIM a kludge. I
rather like the spec. I was merely attempting to state a preference
against instituting a kludge for the sake of backwards compatibility.
Again, my apologies.
-andy
On Oct 21, 2005, at 6:17 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
Please,
This time in BoF chair mode.
Discussing things like "kludges", "infinite improvements",
"rubber stamp" etc is just not productive for either
supposed "side".
I doubt that anyone is really suggesting any of those things
so let's try keep it grounded.
There's just no point in having that discussion in such an
abstract way - you'll just end up doing it over again when
some concrete additions/restrictions are proposed.
Can we kill this thread now? I believe we've elucidated all
that we can wrt the subject line already.
Now if anyone knows of any more vulnerabilities we should
be considering now or later as part of threat analysis then
threads on those would be good to see.
Stephen.
Dave Crocker wrote:
Andrew,
If you are characterizing any change as more work, then you are
arguing for a rubber stamp.
Oh? You mean that doing more work does NOT take more time?
What I am "arguing for" is careful attention to the question of
urgency. Some folks see an urgent need for this standard. Some
do not.
Particularly for those of us who view the need as urgent, there is
a serious downside in delays that are due to the natural desire
that engineers have for making infinite improvements.
In fact I have been getting a sense of some folks delaying
adoption until the IETF standard is produced.
All the more reason that we deliver something thought out and not
insist upon kludges for the sake of backwards compatibility.
Which kludges are you referring to?
d/
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