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Re: [ietf-dkim] Suggested alternate algorithm specification language, for now

2006-02-22 12:38:27

----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Crocker" <dcrocker(_at_)bbiw(_dot_)net>
To: "Eliot Lear" <lear(_at_)cisco(_dot_)com>
Cc: "Ned Freed" <ned(_dot_)freed(_at_)mrochek(_dot_)com>; 
<ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org>

However I think the model for the spec language is clear:

    A validator MUST support {SHA-1, SHA-256}.
    A signer SHOULD use {SHA-256}.

We can, of course, add discussion about the trade-offs.  This might
lead to the somewhat unusual alternative for signer language,
along the lines of:

A signer MAY use {SHA-1} for its lower overhead, in spite of
potentially reduced security strength.  A signer SHOULD use
{SHA-256} for its higher security strength.

Ok, folks.  What have I missed?

Nothing in my view. Since it is a rehash of what I posted this morning:

http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002305.html

I agree with this.  I don't understand why it would be unusual. It follows
Postel's Law:

     "Be conservative in what you send, liberal in what you receive."

and IMO, its not really a question of algorithm by the level of strength one
wishes to use.

If one alternative change the above is done, I would probably say:

    A signer HAS the option of using {SHA1, SHA-256} depending
    on the strength it chooses to sign mail with.  The signer
    SHOULD use the highest strength when all possible.

Someone should make a note that a Migration clarification and insight
related this topic will be required.

Also, a possible solution:

- Signer/Validator Capability "Handshake" Logic

A validator can define a SSP-like DNS policy that defines the capabilities
of the validator.

Signers can then have the ability (based on advanced implementation) to
pre-examine a target to see what strength it supports.  This will only work
for a direct transaction (1 to 1, not 1 to many). But it allows for a
client/server "capability handshake" so to speak.

--
Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc.
http://www.santronics.com




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