In the terminology used in ssp-requirements-01, "Strict" (as used in
allman-dkim-ssp-02) is represented by "signing complete" plus an
expectation that the signature wouldn't be broken, as a mailing list
(for example) might do. Trying to introduce "strict" here would require
a lot of changes elsewhere in the document that refer to expectations
separately from practices.
However, my reading of 4.1 doesn't make it clear that the stronger
expectation is being used, which I think is the source of confusion when
comparing it with 4.2.
-Jim
Douglas Otis wrote:
Sorry,
This repeats a message sent earlier today with the subject:
ssp-requirements-01 // DKIM Strict definition needed. There have been
comments that notice nothing differentiates 4.1 from 4.2. This was
discussed previously but not incorporated in the revision. This
definition is compatible with terms used in Eric's latest draft as well.
2. Definitions
Add:
o DKIM Strict: the state where the domain holder believes that all
legitimate mail purportedly from the domain are sent with a
valid DKIM signature and that non-compliant services are avoided.
4.1. Scenario 1: Bigbank.example.com
...
Was:
,---
|Note that for the foreseeable future, DKIM signature breakage for
|unrestricted use patterns (ie with users and especially where users
|are members of mailing lists) will likely suffer occasional damage in
|transit. While probably not a large percentage of total traffic, the
|kind (quality) of breakage may be significant for certain usage
|patterns. As such, this scenario defines a more limited situation
|where the risk of a legitimate piece of mail being mislabeled as
|unsigned outweights the risk of illegitimate mail being delivered in
|the eyes of the sender.
'___
Change to:
:Note that for the foreseeable future, DKIM signature breakage for
:unrestricted use patterns (ie with users and especially where users
:are members of mailing lists) will likely suffer occasional damage in
:transit. While probably not a large percentage of total traffic, the
:kind (quality) of breakage may be significant for certain usage
:patterns. As such, this scenario defines a more limited situation
:where the risk of a legitimate piece of mail being mislabeled as
:unsigned outweights the risk of illegitimate mail being delivered in
:the eyes of the sender. [Rather than indicating a DKIM Signer
:Complete state, DKIM Strict would be used instead.]
-Doug
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according
tohttp://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html