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RE: [ietf-dkim] RE: I think we can punt the hard stuff as out ofscope.

2007-06-06 11:57:17
Stephen has almost captured my issues here.

My point here is that since NOMAIL is not a MUST requirement we do not require 
the same level of design for deployment as for a feature that is a core 
requirement. In particular it is acceptable for us to specify a scheme which 
requires deployment of new DNS infrastructure for NOMAIL, this seems obvious to 
me as there are existing schemes which address this requirement.

I do want to solve NOMAIL, in fact I think that it is essential that we do so 
to close all possible avenues of attack, including the unsigned mail from 
nonexistent domain attack. However I am quite happy for expression of NOMAIL to 
require deployment of an XPTR capable DNS server.

I am proposing a scheme here which allows for a transition to a principled 
infrastructure in which NOMAIL like DKIM is supported as a first class entity. 


All I don't want to do is to discuss the details of NOMAIL implementation at 
this point. If we get the structure right they take about half an hour.

-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Stephen 
Farrell
Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2007 10:45 AM
To: Hector Santos
Cc: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] RE: I think we can punt the hard 
stuff as out ofscope.


Hector,

You are correct that there is no MUST NOT. But the fact that 
we excised the MUST is significant. I interpret that as follows:

- Its ok for someone to develop a proposal for how nomail 
could be included, so long as it doesn't get in the way of 
the meeting the MUST & SHOULD requirements, which we do first 
(that's sort-of what PHB suggested yesterday, I think);
- its not ok to hold up work on the basis that nomail isn't included.

Later in your mail you seem to say that there was some 
ambiguity when we decided the above. I totally disagree with 
that - the mail archive is very clear.

Regards,
Stephen.

Hector Santos wrote:
Grown up?

Stephen,

I don't think the whatever the STRAWPOLL was based on, it 
was VERY clear.

Going back, I can now see that it appears this was for the 
REQUIREMENTS not for a SSP proposal itself.

The issue came about MUST NOT REQUIRE THAT SSP LOOKUP BE FIRST.

We debated this back and forth as well and it was made clear that 
requirement does not MEAN proposals can not include such logic.

It does not SAY that a "SSP" proposal MUST NOT include a 
NOMAIL provision.

You are making it sound that it MUST NOT include a NOMAIL provision 
which is 100% uncategorily wrong.

And now it is clear the issue was not poised correctly. 
Based on your 
footnotes below, the question was brought up because some one felt
(incorrectly) that it was a specific form of "strict."

    5.3 (2): IIRC we've identified "never send mail" as a special
    case of "strict", and then just not sending mail, let
    alone signing it. IMO you can delete this point.

if this is basis of the issue, it was INCORRECTLY though out.

There is no relationship with STRICT and NOMAIL.  STRICT is 
related to 
exclusive SIGNING or NO SIGNING which is different than NO MAIL.

The point is simple:

It doesn't make sense to REMOVE a NOMAIL policy.  If a 
domain is based 
forged with fake signatures, why should a VERIFIER be left with the 
overhead of processing FAILED signature without any 
recourse of simply 
DELETING this MAIL?

If the DOMAIN says, there SHOULD BE NO MAIL based on this 
DOMAIN, then 
that is a CLEAR indicator of abuse which the verifier 
should delete. 
It protects the verifier and it protects the domain.

We can't say NO SIGNATURE is equivalent to NO MAIL, but that is not 
enough to handle this type of abusive mail.

If I receive an email with an domain such as:

      secured.cs.tcd.de

and it is NOT signed, the DOMAIN can clearly TELL me 
whether this is 
expected or not:

   1  - This message MUST NEVER be signed

   2  - This message MUST ALWAYS be signed

   3  - This message MAY be signed

   4  - This messages MUST never have secure.cs.tcd.de because
        we DON'T send mail with this this domain.

With 1 and 3, the message is acceptable, with 2 and 4, I 
can mark this 
message is bad or maybe get rid of this junk.

The #4 is important because this is a HIGH POTENTIAL 
transaction once 
domains begin to turn on there DKIM system. There will be many 
currently exploited domains that will come in with no 
signatures and 
unless they all do #2, #4 is the only way to cleanly with NO FALSE 
positives, to get rid of this abuse.


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