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Re: [ietf-dkim] Wrong Discussion - was Why mailing lists should strip DKIM signatures

2010-04-27 12:44:30
On Apr 27, 2010, at 1:34 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

-----Original Message-----
From: Jeff Macdonald [mailto:macfisherman(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2010 10:05 AM
To: McDowell, Brett
Cc: Murray S. Kucherawy; ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Wrong Discussion - was Why mailing lists
should strip DKIM signatures

That's interesting.  Let's make this concrete... I'll use myself as
an example.

X = me/PayPal.com
Y = this list/ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Z = Google's Gmail service [1]

It is my assumption that someone subscribed to this list has a
gmail.com account (or a Yahoo.com account [2]).  Therefore, my use case
is simple.  I would hope that those of you reading this from your Gmail
or Yahoo! accounts actually receive this message.  If Z breaks the
signature, you won't see this.

how about Y breaking the signature? I see your message only because I
told gmail's filtering system to not put messages into the spam folder
for this list. Otherwise it would of gone into the spam folder.
Looking at the source of the message, I only see the list's DKIM
signature.

Y breaking the signature isn't relevant (in this hypothesis).  Y also says 
when it got the message from X, X's signature was intact.  That Y messed up 
the signature, making Z unable to verify it directly, is not important; Z 
trusts Y, so Z trusts Y's Authentication-Results: that says X's signature was 
fine when it got to Y.

Should the policy statements be ignored at that point?

In this hypothesis, they could be.  Or, they could be applied.  If X's ADSP 
says "all" or "discardable", and Z trusts Y, and Y claims X's message had a 
valid signature, ADSP is satisfied.


That's how I see it.  The key is that Y *validates* the DKIM signature and 
processes the sender's ADSP when it receives the message before taking it's 
next action.  If Y didn't actually validate with comparable rigor as Z, then Z 
would have no basis to trust mail from Y.
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