in section 9.1.1 an attack is considered where all the email addresses are
spoofed and sent to many locations to cause an DOS attack on the key server.
I have been thinking about this a bit, and given the magnification of
mailing lists, it seems this might be a practical attack.
Say there were a bunch of list servers that did not check signatures. The
attacker sends a message that is spoofed from flufffy(_at_)cisco(_dot_)com to
say a
10^3 lists that magnifies it to say 10^6 messages which all result in a hit
to the cisco.com KRS.
I'm not sure if this is a problem or not, perhaps they will skew enough to
smooth out over a reasonable time. Perhaps the keys users on the lists will
correlate enough that caching ends up significantly reducing the hits to the
KRS.
Thoughts?