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Re: revised Proposed Charter

2005-07-25 11:19:04


On Jul 25, 2005, at 7:56 AM, Michael Thomas wrote:

That said, I favor the crispness of the current charter/spec:
specs in this area have an almost perfect track record of
flopping in large part, IMO, due to their being unintelligablely
complex. Even the "simplicity" of the current spec brings up
deep and hard questions. Combinatorics is the enemy.

Ensuring deployment success seems a vital concern. Just those issues will comprise a considerable amount of time. Initially keeping the diversity of the basics constrained, such as where the key is obtained, does not prevent those wishing to investigate and experiment with alternative schemes. The simple tag/value syntax does not preclude such alternatives in the future. DomainKeys has already demonstrated the viability of the DNS approach. If there is success and a desire for such alternatives, subsequent changes can be made. However, it seems wrong to widen the scope of the charter to encompass more than the initial step being considered in this process.


Earl Hood wrote:

Wrt DKIM, the trust component is established via DNS.  The signature
verifier trusts that the records it achieves from a DNS query are the
records owned by the domain being queried.  The trust solely relies
on the reliability and security of the DNS transport protocol.
For some, this may be sufficient, but for others, this is definitely
not sufficient.  Because of security risks associated with DNS (along
with some of the key management aspects of it) others, including
myself, would definitely like to see hooks in DKIM to allow for
other PKI systems, systems that provide more robust trust models.

S/MIME has this feature already, and enjoys wide client deployment. It lacks any significant use. S/MIME or secure documents may become an alternative for such minor needs requiring higher security often related to the author of the document. How this high security problem is solved is really independent of an effort attempting to scale for the wide use of an authentication scheme suitable for the exchange of email. Here I tend to agree with Mike.

-Doug


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