So by using DNS we've already addressed this particular
problem. Wether the
domain itself is trustworthy or not, I believe, is not the
decision of any
central authority or array of loosely centralized
authorities. The recipient decides.[1]
The problem with this approach is that it means that you can only
have negative accreditation data.
This get you into the problem of trying to police the entire net
which as MAPS and SPEWS prove is impossible to do well.
As a sender I get to choose which positive actions I will take
to obtain an accreditation. I can choose to obtain an accreditation
from one source or many. But I have to choose which ones I get
the accreditation from.
As a receiver you get to choose whether to take any notice of
it at all, or even that the accreditation is so widely abused
that you will consider that advertising it reduces my reputation.
My impression is no e-mail domain admins want any centralized
authority or collection thereof to say they're allowed to send mail.
My impression is that they hate MAPS, SPEWS and everyone in between
with a passion, precisely because they have set themselves up to do
that.
There is an immense demand for a credible multi-party whitelist scheme.
Instead of separately having to get an erroneous blacklist entry
cancelled at AOL, Comcast, Yahoo etc, show that you are not a spammer.
As I said at the time, 'collateral damage' is an ego trip for the
blacklists that causes real harm to innocent parties.
Phill