On Mar 29, 2004, at 5:31 PM, John Leslie wrote:
I do not agree that "spam generated from compromised hosts" is
excluded
from our scope. Nor do I see how anyone can believe that mail generated
by "ill-meaning senders" is out of scope.
In both contexts, I was referring to a domain, MTA, etc... that has a
valid MARID RR but has either been compromised or intentionally sends
spam. So for example, accreditation might solve this problem, but at
present that is beyond the scope of the work in front of us.
The overall point here is that there are many causes of spam, but we
are only seeking a charter to solve a subset of the problem.
Our scope _is_ limited, yes, but the limits are that we are
designing
a mechanism for storing and distributing "authorization" information.
You left out 'MTA' as in:
The primary current use case for this facility is to allow
recipient
MTAs to confirm that peer MTAs' actions are authorized by
specific domains or networks.
and
It will not consider anti-spam abatement
measures outside of the area of MTA authorization.
New structure/RR's in .arpa *
Huh?
in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa
-andy