And with all due respect for your credentials and expertise, I have a
problem grasping your philosophy and analogies. Phone and Snail Mail
actually has better security than SMTP. POTS enjoys "real" caller-id
technology and snail mail atleast as a "permit" system and "official"
delivery entity in place.
I guess that makes me 'stupid' in your eyes, I guess that makes me
"un-informed" in your view, I guess that makes me well, not worth hearing
out. That's how I see it played out in the IETF "arena."
Look, it is a SMTP problem and the SOLUTION is at SMTP. Either you change
it, clean it up or you don't. Can't expect chaos and hence, a propensity to
stability to occur unless the target audience is forced to adapt as well.
I apologize for my tone if viewed the wrong way, but this attitude has been
what's keep the required R&D for SMTP "3821" to materialized. Where the
hell is John Klensin? That is has been the biggest disappointment to me as
an "greenie" (not to be construed as inexperience) in IETF. The #1 person
that should be INVOLVED in any SMTP related discussion hasn't set foot in
the WG - then and now. He gave me his reasons privately.
Now explained that?
I even suggested that he pass the torch to someone who can sincerely
champion the next era of Email and SMTP development. Obviously, its a
struggle for some in IETF let go.
Sorry
Sincerely,
Hector Santos, CTO
Santronics Software, Inc.
http://www.santronics.com
305-431-2846 Cell
305-248-3204 Office
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Crocker" <dhc(_at_)dcrocker(_dot_)net>
To: "Alan DeKok" <aland(_at_)ox(_dot_)org>; "MXCOMP"
<ietf-mxcomp(_at_)imc(_dot_)org>
Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2004 10:59 AM
Subject: Re: FTC stuff 0) Lies 1)Yahoo & DK. 2)GoDaddy DNS & SPF & CSV.
3)Dean & FUSSP. 4)Testing 5)EFF, Anonymity.
On Sat, 20 Nov 2004 09:33:05 -0500, Alan DeKok wrote:
The key here is "open discussion"...
Some major keys to open discussion is that people avoid ad hominem
attacks -- for example, they do not call people liars -- and they avoid
hyperbole. For example:
The failure of SMTP to protect from forgery, malicious bounces,
etc. is a failure of the security model of SMTP.
The security model of SMTP is the same as the security model for sending
paper letters and for making phone calls.
To "fail" requires that there be a goal that was not attained. That's not
the case here. The case here is that real threats changed after 25 years of
operation and we need to adjust to them.
When crime goes up because a small town becomes a big city, and we have to
add locks to our doors, we do not say that the security model that used to
work "failed". We say that it changed.
The key to open discussion is that people say things thoughtfully and with
an attempt to be accurate and precise.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
+1.408.246.8253
dcrocker a t ...
www.brandenburg.com