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Padgett wrote, quoting Adam:
A weakly comparable example might be perhaps the IPSEC standardisation
process, and the effect of export regulations on key sizes. Are IPSEC
key sizes allowed to be restricted in the standards so that IPSEC
products can be exportable?
Hope you are not referring to PGP 5.5 here, key sizes are the same
as they have always been. Recovery key can be up to 2048 bits.
No, IPSec is a totally different standard relating to Internet Protocol
Security. See IETF drafts at http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsec.html
Really all that is needed
in the standard is the ability to send to multiple recipients - *how*
or *who* they are is up to the vendor, has nothing to do with the
transmission protocol.
OK. We have that. Can we stick with that, rather than adding a field to
a public key that says "if you don't also encrypt to this corporate
access key, your message will simply not be read."
a gateway or postoffice could refuse to
handle any message that did not have a specified recipient(s) but again this
has nothing to do with the transmission protocol.
It does, as it tells sending users that they MUST use the corporate key
or the message will not be received.
Regards,
Ian.
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