On 6 May 2015, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Hmm but if it can be easily done, is there anything that speaks
against?
There is such a thing as over-engineering, and increasing a fingerprint
bit length upwards of 160 bits "just because we can" seems to go in that
direction. 160 bits is all the hashes ever calculated by the entire
bitcoin network bitcoin network times all the hashes ever calculated by
the entire bitcoin network.
Someone said "length is important", I wanted to bring that point back
into discussion. I would really prefer not to have every user of
FuturePGP read 25 rather than 20 characters to people just because we
thought "why not" on this list. The last thing openpgp needs is
stronger technical security assertions at the cost of usability.
- V
_______________________________________________
openpgp mailing list
openpgp(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp