On Wed, 2015-05-06 at 09:16 +0200, Vincent Breitmoser wrote:
There is such a thing as over-engineering, and increasing a fingerprint
bit length upwards of 160 bits "just because we can" seems to go in that
direction.
Technically you may be right, but I think it's nevertheless the wrong
paradigm to approach security... "wrong" of course in the sense that
there are different paradigms and I'm on the other side ;-)
Generally we don't know for sure what our attackers (especially the big
ones like NSA) are capable of (right now), but it's likely that they're
at least some years ahead in terms of research. Neither do we know for
sure how cryptoanalysis moves on.
My paradigm is to generally assume the worst case respectively
strengthen crypto the most possible so that it's still usable (in the
technical sense).
Cheers,
Chris.
smime.p7s
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