On Mon, 7 Jun 2021, Peter Gutmann wrote:
We are happy to accept such proposed text, please send it to the list :)
Well, if I write it people may be less happy with the text :-). OK, how
about, after the paragraph "Note that it is possible for there to be
collisions of Key IDs", add:
Thanks :)
-- Snip --
There are no cryptographic issues introduced by this since the fingerprint is
merely a fixed-length opaque value used to identify the variable-length
structured data that makes up a public key. In particular the move to SHA-256
for V5 fingerprints was made not to address any cryptographic vulnerability
but to avoid the perception that something insecure might be happening due to
the use of SHA-1.
-- Snip --
With no hats on, I would probably change the latter bit to:
In particular the move to SHA-256 for V5 fingerprints was not made to address
any cryptographic vulnerability, but was made to follow the generic
guidelines of the cryptograhic community to sunset the use of SHA-1.
This would then also capture other reasons than the one you mention,
such as possible unavailability in crypto libaries or runtime modes
(FIPS) etc etc.
Paul
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