Alex,
u really need to recharter if u want to address current concerns.
They are complaining about bad certificates.
Basically, we can not (OPES) be in the way without comming up with a new
model.
Abbie
-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Rousskov [mailto:rousskov(_at_)measurement-factory(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 12:51 PM
To: Barbir, Abbie [CAR:1A11:EXCH]
Cc: Markus Hofmann; 'ietf-openproxy(_at_)imc(_dot_)org'
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Abbie Barbir wrote:
U need to recharter first.
Not if we are addressing current IESG concerns about an
existing WG document with a couple of paragraphs, I guess. I
am not proposing any new "real work" in this direction.
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Rousskov [mailto:rousskov(_at_)measurement-factory(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 12:03 PM
To: Markus Hofmann
Cc: 'ietf-openproxy(_at_)imc(_dot_)org'
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
Markus,
I am somewhat surprised there is something special that
needs to be
developed for a hop-by-hop encryption model, but I do not
know what
IESG had to say about this issue (beyond a cryptic
statement on the
ID tracker). If IESG turns this revision around again,
let's discuss
how we can document hop-by-hop encryption to address IESG
concerns.
Thanks,
Alex.
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Markus Hofmann wrote:
Folks,
this updated version of the draft addresses issues in Section
2.2.7 that came back from IESG review.
The section has been re-written to clarify that - for now -
the OPES
work assumes either no encryption (in which case OPES
services can be
performed) or end-to-end encryption (in which case no OPES
services can be performed). If encryption would be desired
hop-by-hop, an appropriate model will have to be developed.
We'll re-submit this version to the IESG.
Thanks,
Markus
Abbie Barbir wrote:
Please publish the following
draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
as a WG Draft.
Thanks
Abbie