Markus,
I am somewhat surprised there is something special that needs
to be developed for a hop-by-hop encryption model, but I do not know
what IESG had to say about this issue (beyond a cryptic statement on
the ID tracker). If IESG turns this revision around again, let's
discuss how we can document hop-by-hop encryption to address IESG
concerns.
Thanks,
Alex.
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Markus Hofmann wrote:
Folks,
this updated version of the draft addresses issues in Section 2.2.7
that came back from IESG review.
The section has been re-written to clarify that - for now - the OPES
work assumes either no encryption (in which case OPES services can be
performed) or end-to-end encryption (in which case no OPES services
can be performed). If encryption would be desired hop-by-hop, an
appropriate model will have to be developed.
We'll re-submit this version to the IESG.
Thanks,
Markus
Abbie Barbir wrote:
Please publish the following
draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
as a WG Draft.
Thanks
Abbie