ietf-openproxy
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03

2003-12-09 14:21:14

Folks,

we put in a clarification that has been OKed by the reviewer, so the document can move on. It also provides the opportunity to come back to the issue of hop-by-hop encryption in a way that will give us enough time to carefully address it.

So, let's wrap this up and focus on the currently open and active documents to get them out. Once this happens, we can talk about possible re-chartering and work items we want to take on.

Thanks,
  Markus

Alex Rousskov wrote:

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Abbie Barbir wrote:


u really need to recharter if u want to address current concerns.


Not if they are concerns can be addressed with clarifications, without
new development.


They are complaining about bad certificates.


From the note on ID tracker, IESG seems to be concerned about one
possible way to implement hop-by-hop encryption. We can show other,
cleaner, existing ways.


Basically, we can not (OPES) be in the way without comming up with a
new model.


I disagree. There are existing alternatives (even deployed systems,
but that info may not be public) that we can point to.

Alex.



-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Rousskov [mailto:rousskov(_at_)measurement-factory(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 12:51 PM
To: Barbir, Abbie [CAR:1A11:EXCH]
Cc: Markus Hofmann; 'ietf-openproxy(_at_)imc(_dot_)org'
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03


On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Abbie Barbir wrote:


U need to recharter first.

Not if we are addressing current IESG concerns about an
existing WG document with a couple of paragraphs, I guess. I
am not proposing any new "real work" in this direction.

Alex.


-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Rousskov [mailto:rousskov(_at_)measurement-factory(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 12:03 PM
To: Markus Hofmann
Cc: 'ietf-openproxy(_at_)imc(_dot_)org'
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03



Markus,

        I am somewhat surprised there is something special that

needs to be

developed for a hop-by-hop encryption model, but I do not

know what

IESG had to say about this issue (beyond a cryptic

statement on the

ID tracker). If IESG turns this revision around again,

let's discuss

how we can document hop-by-hop encryption to address IESG

concerns.

Thanks,

Alex.

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Markus Hofmann wrote:


Folks,

this updated version of the draft addresses issues in Section
2.2.7 that came back from IESG review.

The section has been re-written to clarify that - for now -

the OPES

work assumes either no encryption (in which case OPES

services can be

performed) or end-to-end encryption (in which case no OPES
services can be performed). If encryption would be desired
hop-by-hop, an appropriate model will have to be developed.

We'll re-submit this version to the IESG.

Thanks,
  Markus


Abbie Barbir wrote:


Please publish the following

draft-ietf-opes-threats-03

as a WG Draft.

Thanks
Abbie



<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>