On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Abbie Barbir wrote:
u really need to recharter if u want to address current concerns.
Not if they are concerns can be addressed with clarifications, without
new development.
They are complaining about bad certificates.
From the note on ID tracker, IESG seems to be concerned about one
possible way to implement hop-by-hop encryption. We can show other,
cleaner, existing ways.
Basically, we can not (OPES) be in the way without comming up with a
new model.
I disagree. There are existing alternatives (even deployed systems,
but that info may not be public) that we can point to.
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Rousskov [mailto:rousskov(_at_)measurement-factory(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 12:51 PM
To: Barbir, Abbie [CAR:1A11:EXCH]
Cc: Markus Hofmann; 'ietf-openproxy(_at_)imc(_dot_)org'
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Abbie Barbir wrote:
U need to recharter first.
Not if we are addressing current IESG concerns about an
existing WG document with a couple of paragraphs, I guess. I
am not proposing any new "real work" in this direction.
Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Rousskov [mailto:rousskov(_at_)measurement-factory(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 12:03 PM
To: Markus Hofmann
Cc: 'ietf-openproxy(_at_)imc(_dot_)org'
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
Markus,
I am somewhat surprised there is something special that
needs to be
developed for a hop-by-hop encryption model, but I do not
know what
IESG had to say about this issue (beyond a cryptic
statement on the
ID tracker). If IESG turns this revision around again,
let's discuss
how we can document hop-by-hop encryption to address IESG
concerns.
Thanks,
Alex.
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Markus Hofmann wrote:
Folks,
this updated version of the draft addresses issues in Section
2.2.7 that came back from IESG review.
The section has been re-written to clarify that - for now -
the OPES
work assumes either no encryption (in which case OPES
services can be
performed) or end-to-end encryption (in which case no OPES
services can be performed). If encryption would be desired
hop-by-hop, an appropriate model will have to be developed.
We'll re-submit this version to the IESG.
Thanks,
Markus
Abbie Barbir wrote:
Please publish the following
draft-ietf-opes-threats-03
as a WG Draft.
Thanks
Abbie