I suggest calling out ESNI specifically as a reason to not log the
SNI in the security considerations, e.g. via:
OLD:
In a few
circumstances, a new Additional-registered-clause might disclose
information to a recipient that was otherwise unavailable.
NEW:
In a few
circumstances, a new Additional-registered-clause might disclose
information to a recipient or other actor (via data leaks) that
was otherwise unavailable. In particular, if the SNI value was
encrypted in the TLS handshake [ESNI] then logging is NOT
RECOMMENDED.
[ESNI] would point at draft-ietf-tls-esni
Even if this isn't a big leak, I think it's still worth preserving
a way in which SNIs don't leak - if the TLS client and server and
TLS client's DNS setup (and maybe the TLS server's too) are all
such that we've not leaked the SNI in any of those places then I
think we're better off if we can avoid leaking it here.
There have been real data leaks of mails where metadata like
this has been revealing [1] and we can't tell in general if some
new bit of data might be correlated with something else later.
Cheers,
S.
[1] https://labs.rs/en/metadata/
On 24/01/2019 19:56, John R Levine wrote:
Apropos of recent discussions about SNI logging, here's a draft that
adds an SNI clause to Received: headers, and per Chris Newman's
suggestion, changes the registry criteria to Expert Review so you don't
need to publish an RFC merely to register a new clause.
Regards,
John Levine, johnl(_at_)taugh(_dot_)com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:44:52
From: internet-drafts(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
A new version of I-D, draft-levine-additional-registered-clauses-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by John Levine and posted to the
IETF repository.
Name: draft-levine-additional-registered-clauses
Revision: 00
Title: Update to Additional Registered Clauses in SMTP Received
Headers
Document date: 2019-01-24
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 4
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-levine-additional-registered-clauses-00.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-levine-additional-registered-clauses/
Htmlized:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-levine-additional-registered-clauses-00
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-levine-additional-registered-clauses
Abstract:
SMTP servers add Received: trace headers to mail messages to track
their progress This document updates the registration criteria for
Additional Registered Clauses in those headers to Expert Review, and
adds a new clause for Server Name Indication (SNI).
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