On 12/26/19 12:12 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
On 12/25/2019 9:06 PM, Keith Moore wrote:
It seems unlikely that practices that further encourage the arms
race, and further degrade the reliability of email, are defensible.
"Encourage" the arms race??? Wow.
So, ummm, you think that the bad actors will act less badly if the
receive-side filtering engines are less effective? That's the simple
implication of saying that applying effective methods encourages their
No, and I didn't say anything of the sort.
What I will say is that relying on filtering criteria that are
completely unrelated to the content of the message not only degrades the
reliability of email over time, and also makes it easier for the bad
actors to game the system.... particularly when, as is likely for EHLO
tags, those filtering criteria are used to the exclusion of everything else.
Or to seek a more affirmative tone:
What exactly is the alternative that will be at least as effective
as what is currently being done?
I've already explained this, and don't believe it's effective to repeat
my previous arguments at this time. And your arguments are without
And by asking this, I'm asking for tested practice, not untested theory.
Try putting some rigor in your own arguments then. Even "tested
practice" is useless without actual measurements and a description of
how those measurements were conducted.
And if you refuse to consider anything that doesn't already exist,
you're insisting that we continue to be stuck with the unacceptable
status quo. Internet users deserve better than that.
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