Re: [ietf-smtp] EHLO domain validation requirement in RFC 5321

Keith Moore writes:

> I thought it was about advice to the server which is currently that the  
> server MUST NOT refuse to accept a message based on failure of EHLO argument  
> verification.
> My argument is that EHLO verification is, in the long run, poor practice and  
> should not be encouraged by 5321bis even if it seems like an effective spam
To me, "SHOULD NOT" is a better match for "should not be encouraged". The  
current phrasing, "MUST NOT", prohibits it.
Whether or not EHLO domain validation is prohibited or not, it is used in  
practice right now, and the current language in 5321 is being ignored, to  
some degree. The same language also existed in 2821, so this has been  
ignored for a while. An Internet standard that does not reflect current  
practice is not as valuable as one which is.

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