At 04:23 PM 6/18/01, Scott Brim wrote:
Publishers lose control of how a resource is treated but still
(optionally) retain control over the resource itself, e.g. through
watermarks. I doubt that publishers care if their content is carried
over Ethernet or ATM today.
How much do publishers care how their
content is encapsulated, routed, encoded, etc.?
Publishers care if their content is damaged in flight (e.g. proxies which
remove or alter content, which includes AOL's mangling of graphics). They
also may care to know how many people and which people are accessing content.
What do you think OPES
could do that a publisher (1) would be concerned about, and (2) could
not protect against?
I think OPES will further the sale of SSL accelerator boxes and web
certificates. If the only way to protect content from uninvited third-party
intermediaries, then content which is not otherwise confidential is going
to be encrypted.
It's one thing if the publisher purposely buys the services of a content
delivery network, it's quite something else when someone inserts a
transparent proxy, especially one which alters the content.
On 18 Jun 2001 at 12:51 -0700, Mark Nottingham apparently wrote:
> As such, the OPES goals break end-to-end transparency at the
> application layer. As a result, (using HTTP as an example, because it
> seems the first target of OPES), the publisher loses control over a
> resource once it leaves their server. It then becomes impossible to
> makes statements about that resource (e.g., P3P, Semantic Web, legal
> status of a resource, etc.).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Senie dts(_at_)senie(_dot_)com
Amaranth Networks Inc. http://www.amaranth.com