Re: WG Review: Open Pluggable Edge Services (opes)

How is this enforced? I.e., what prevents an ISP from running an 
ad-insertion service using OPES mechanisms in transparent proxies?
I know that the group working on OPES doesn't intend these uses. 
However, there isn't anything in the design that will prevent them 
(please tell me if I've missed something), and everything I've seen 
indicates that interposition of services by access providers is by far 
the largest market for this technology.
Cheers,


Maciocco, Christian wrote:

> > Publishers care if their content is damaged in flight (e.g. 
> > proxies which remove or alter content, which includes AOL's mangling of 
> > graphics). They also may care to know how many people and which people are
> > accessing content.
> One advantages offered by OPES is that the publisher only allows their
> trusted services to be run at the edge(s) of the network. Services are run
> explicitely, not transparently.
>
>
> > I think OPES will further the sale of SSL accelerator boxes and web 
> > certificates. If the only way to protect content from 
> > uninvited third-party intermediaries, then content which is not otherwise 
> > confidential is going to be encrypted.
> > It's one thing if the publisher purposely buys the services 
> > of a content delivery network, it's quite something else when someone
> inserts a 
>
> > transparent proxy, especially one which alters the content.
> See above.
>
> Christian
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Daniel Senie [mailto:dts(_at_)senie(_dot_)com]
> > Sent: Monday, June 18, 2001 2:01 PM
> > To: Scott Brim; Mark Nottingham
> > Cc: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
> > Subject: RE: WG Review: Open Pluggable Edge Services (opes)
> >
> >
> > At 04:23 PM 6/18/01, Scott Brim wrote:
> >
> > > Publishers lose control of how a resource is treated but still
> > > (optionally) retain control over the resource itself, e.g. through
> > > watermarks.  I doubt that publishers care if their content is carried
> > > over Ethernet or ATM today.
> >
> > > How much do publishers care how their
> > > content is encapsulated, routed, encoded, etc.?
> > Publishers care if their content is damaged in flight (e.g. 
> > proxies which 
> > remove or alter content, which includes AOL's mangling of 
> > graphics). They 
> > also may care to know how many people and which people are 
> > accessing content.
> >
> > > What do you think OPES
> > > could do that a publisher (1) would be concerned about, and (2) could
> > > not protect against?
> > I think OPES will further the sale of SSL accelerator boxes and web 
> > certificates. If the only way to protect content from 
> > uninvited third-party 
> > intermediaries, then content which is not otherwise 
> > confidential is going 
> > to be encrypted.
> > It's one thing if the publisher purposely buys the services 
> > of a content 
> > delivery network, it's quite something else when someone inserts a 
> > transparent proxy, especially one which alters the content.
> >
> > > On 18 Jun 2001 at 12:51 -0700, Mark Nottingham apparently wrote:
> > >
> > > > As such, the OPES goals break end-to-end transparency at the
> > > > application layer. As a result, (using HTTP as an 
> > example, because it
> >
> > > > seems the first target of OPES), the publisher loses 
> > control over a
> >
> > > > resource once it leaves their server. It then becomes 
> > impossible to
> >
> > > > makes statements about that resource (e.g., P3P, Semantic 
> > Web, legal
> >
> > > > status of a resource, etc.).
> > -----------------------------------------------------------------
> > Daniel Senie                                        dts(_at_)senie(_dot_)com
> > Amaranth Networks Inc.                    http://www.amaranth.com

--
Mark Nottingham, Research Scientist
Akamai Technologies (San Mateo, CA USA)