On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
Dean Anderson wrote:
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be.
Correct, and I gave an explanation for this in inforamtion theory.
What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
spam is less than 100%.
No, information theory doesn't say that at all. Indeed, the probably of
detecting spam is probably very close to 100%
This has nothing to do with what or what not the IETF can do to prevent
spam.
No, it is quite useful: The IETF can do nothing to prevent spam.
What interests the IETF are technical spam solutions, for example,
that would prevent email that comes from unidentifiable or rogue
senders/MTAs to be ever received.
The only thing that can acheive this is to turn off the computer.
Not because spam is detected as such but because untrusted,
unidentifiable or rogue senders/MTAs are detected. Yeah, this would
still leave room for trusted and identifiable senders/MTAs to send spam
messages. But such spammers are no longer a hidden target. And it would
be a lot harder for someone to send spam on behalf of you.
These are examples of feasible technical, IETF-relevant solutions to
spam, not at all denied by information theory.
The IETF can specify protocols with certain features, say PKI, but doing
so will not prevent spam, since the IETF (nor anyone else) cannot specify
a 'spam-free' protocol. This is a result of information theory.
To implement these solutions, we need an Internet design where we
recognize that the end points have become much less trusted than the
connection. This is the opposite of what the DARPA Internet assumed and
was designed for. So, some things gotta change.