ietf
[Top] [All Lists]

RE: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation (Transport LayerSecurity (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension) to Proposed Standard

2009-12-01 13:33:30
I disagree that the last call is premature.  I realize that not everyone
is happy with all aspects of the current document but a clear majority
of people on the TLS list have voiced their support for it.  I do not
see any consensus that the existing approach is flawed, nor do I see
evidence of an emerging consensus on an alternative approach. 

This document fixes a serious security hole in TLS and so it is
important to finish it in a timely manner. While a minority of the WG
may feel that it this draft isn't exactly the way it would like, it does
address the relevant security issue. I don't feel that waiting several
more weeks to see if consensus forms around some other approach is
likely to be useful.

Joe
(Speaking as TLS Working Group Co-Chair)

-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On 
Behalf Of Yoav Nir
Sent: Tuesday, December 01, 2009 2:06 AM
To: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Cc: tls(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org Group
Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation 
(Transport LayerSecurity (TLS) Renegotiation Indication 
Extension) to Proposed Standard


On Nov 30, 2009, at 5:37 PM, The IESG wrote:

The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
(tls) to consider the following document:

- 'Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication 
Extension '
  <draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-01.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, 
and solicits 
final comments on this action.  Please send substantive comments to 
the ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org mailing lists by 2009-12-14. 
Exceptionally, comments 
may be sent to iesg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org instead. In either case, please 
retain 
the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

I oppose publishing the current draft. 

There are two unresolved issues still being discussed on the 
TLS mailing list: 
 1. non-extension signaling for older versions (SSLv3 and 
maybe TLS 1.0)  2. explicit vs implicit addition of old 
verify_data to the PRF (also known as fail-unsafe vs fail-safe)

I think the WG is converging, and that a couple of more weeks 
of discussion may lead to consensus. 

I agree with David-Sarah Hopwood that a last call (WG or 
IETF) is still premature.

_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf