Knives are easily available to anyone, just like encryption.
...and just like pervasive monitoring?
In both, the product has already proliferated, and it is not possible to
roll back to a state where it hasn't.
Also, both of those have proven to have both too numerous and
unquantifiable good and bad uses, and both of it in scale; there is no
obvious, generally-accepted world-wide agreement that either of the two
can only be used for nefarious purposes.
So, I feel good comparing knives with pervasive monitoring.
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/12/09/tech-giants-band-together-for-nsa-reform/
the irony of corporations that are profiting from pervasive monitoring -
that's how Facebook and Google work - complaining
about government pervasive monitoring is not lost on me.
What I don't feel good about is perpass-attack, which is going to
be at best ignored, or wildly misinterpreted and misused by its intended
audience. It's primarily a kneejerk reaction to news events to assuage
the consciences of IETF insiders.
also, do we get drafts through last call by simply now announcing in
the draft that it has been through last call? That does make things
easier. Must start writing 'this RFC' in drafts, which will help that
benighted state come to pass.
Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood/