I agree with you,
IETF should consider policies for designing protocols/technologies for
the public user community in all regions with diversity and fareness.
If the IETF still does not know how to solve attacks on the
internet/design/practice, so why will it allow separting related IANA
functions.
The first message in the thread suggests the motivation is to protect
IETF but what about protecting the Internet users in the world.
AB
On 1/6/14, John Curran <jcurran(_at_)istaff(_dot_)org> wrote:
On Jan 6, 2014, at 2:58 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker
<hallam(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:
I am not suggesting changing the operation of the registry or taking it
away from ICANN which is what I would see as 'blowing the bolts'.
I am suggesting painting a new sign for the protocol side of the
functions.
The closest analogy I have is that in Vermont during hunting season it is
very common to find a cow with 'COW' painted on the side in big white
letters. The reason for this is that there is a particular type of
'hunter' who comes up from the city once a year with his mates, a large
quantity of beer and an injudicious quantity of firearms and ammunition.
They are liable shoot anything that moves. Labeling the livestock is the
best way to mitigate the losses.
...
It is admirable goal, i.e. setup things so that the IETF is truly doing just
technical coordination,
and thus does not attract any government/policy attention... However, it
does sort of presume
that the "protocol development side" stays away from such public policy
matters, does it not?
Alas, the success of the Internet actually preempts any reasonable chance of
creating competing
protocols and approaches that will achieve similar success - basic network
economies make
interoperability with (and therefore adoption of) IETF-specified protocols a
near absolute
requirement for successful global deployment. For example, if the IETF
decides that certain
protocol should be encrypted by default, then governments have to live with
that outcome;
i.e. arguing that there is any meaningful workaround is specious.
What happens when the IETF makes a decision that particular "public policy"
requirements
are _to be considered_ (perpass), or specifically _not to be considered_
(RFC 2804) in protocol
development? Such is the equivalent of exercising a "control point" (your
term) on the Internet,
and one that's entirely with respect to protocol development matters (not
names or numbers).
The fact that there is not an "enforcement mechanism" doesn't preclude the
control point aspects;
i.e. if there's an IETF consensus (quite appropriately) that pervasive
surveillance activities are
"a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF
protocols", then governments
are impacted by that public policy decision of the IETF.
The vulnerability is to folk whose knowledge of the IETF and IANA is
equivalent to the weekend hunter types. It is important to take the issue
off the table.
See above. The IETF would also need to truly be neutral (and not imbed
publicl policy values
into protocol requirements) in order to take the issue off the table.
Trying to separate the IANA
tasks with the theoretical goal of technical purity thus would mean not
advancing some fairly
important social values, and these already put the IETF into the cross-hairs
due to the control
aspects.
/John
Disclaimer: My views alone.