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 Re: Declaring an Identity2005-05-20 01:03:49
 
At 06:10 PM 5/19/2005 -0700, william(at)elan.net wrote:
 
On Thu, 19 May 2005, David MacQuigg wrote:
 OK, let's nail this down.  Here is the example incoming email, with the 
proposed ID command.  Assume you have no prior relationship with the 
sender, so you don't know what authentication method he uses.
  EHLO  mailserver7.bigforwarder.com
  ID  bigforwarder.com
  MAIL 
FROM:<<mailto:bob(_at_)sales(_dot_)some-company(_dot_)com>bob(_at_)sales(_dot_)some-company(_dot_)com>
 
How did you ever manage to invent that mailfrom syntax :)
 
I think Eudora invented it. :>)  I'm sending plain text.  Maybe it was 
Hypermail at listbox.com.  Here it is without the angle 
brackets:       MAIL FROM: bob(_at_)sales(_dot_)some-company(_dot_)com 
and without @:  MAIL FROM:<bob at sales.some-company.com>
 Without the ID command, you will waste a bunch of DNS queries and 
possibly conclude this sender offers no authentication.
 
He doesn't!!!!!
If sender wants to authenticate, he can just go ahead and use AUTH command,
Authentication involves mutual pre-negotiated trust.
 
We're talking about a syntax that might be useful for SPF, CSV, DomainKeys, 
etc.  None of these require pre-negotiation.  I hope this isn't the start 
of a debate on the meaning of "authentication". 
So, to get back on track, assume you are a well-equipped receiver, and you 
have available any method that might be needed, including the three I 
mentioned.  All you know about the incoming mail is it's IP address, the 
following two commands: 
  EHLO  mailserver7.bigforwarder.com
  MAIL FROM:<bob-at-sales.some-company.com>
What do you do to avoid a DNS hunt?
I disagree with your statements below, but lets focus for now on this first 
barrier.  If we can't get past this, the rest of the discussion may be a waste. 
--
Dave
************************************************************     *
* David MacQuigg, PhD     email: david_macquigg at yahoo.com     *  *
* IC Design Engineer            phone:  USA 520-721-4583      *  *  *
* Analog Design Methodologies                                 *  *  *
*                                 9320 East Mikelyn Lane       * * *
* VRS Consulting, P.C.            Tucson, Arizona 85710          *
************************************************************     *
 On the other hand its the recipient that decides which identity (not 
address, but identity type) it needs for whatever mechanism it wants to 
use to find if client can be trusted (i.e. accreditation/reputation call).
Note that its important to understand that if there was no pre-negotiated
trust then all decisions should be left to recipient and nothing that
sender gives about its identity can be believed.
 For each possible Identity (mailserver7.bigforwarder.com, 
bigforwarder.com, sales.some-company.com, some-company.com) you need to 
search every possible location for DNS records (<Identity>, 
_client._smtp.<Identity>, ...), and we still haven't searched all the 
header identities.  This is what I mean by DNS "hunting" - searching for 
records that may not be there.
 
The thing is if those identities involve different domains/addresses, you 
still end up searching from all those locations. If they involve same 
domain, there is some value in having lookup at one dns record instead of 
several and be able to see policies for multiple identities and verification
records for different authorization methods (i.e. I agree with you that 
there is value in putting cryptographic verification into SPF record as 
modifier, but as I'm worried about size of such records, my preference has 
always been on fingerprint data in dns, rather then public key; 
additionally with crypto auth info, its easy to specify exact location, so 
all that is needed is really to confirm that specified location is 
associated with correct identity, which means something like SRV). 
 With the ID command, the receiving MTA does a DNS query for a TXT record 
at a standard location, like _AUTH.bigforwarder.com.mail.net  The query 
returns a record that specifies exactly what methods are supported by the 
owner of the Identity.
 
Which identity?!!!! You do not know if it is "Sender" or "From" or "MAILFROM"
and without that the info you have means nothing (also note that all the 
above I listed are identities associated with message sender but you're 
taking it to mean that each identity would be one associated with last 
hop, which is only true for EHLO). You also can not actually verify the 
majority of identities until you see message header and for most
cryptographic proposals (domainkeys BUT NOT metasignatures) you need 
entire messge data before you can verify. 
 
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Re: Standards Strategy, (continued)
Re: Standards Strategy, wayne
Re: Standards Strategy, David MacQuigg
Re: Standards Strategy, william(at)elan.net
Declaring an Identity, David MacQuigg
Re: Declaring an Identity, william(at)elan.net
Re: Declaring an Identity,
David MacQuigg <=
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Avoiding the DNS Hunt, David MacQuigg
Re: Avoiding the DNS Hunt, Alex van den Bogaerdt
Re: Avoiding the DNS Hunt, Terry Fielder
Re: Avoiding the DNS Hunt, Daniel Taylor
Re: Declaring an Identity, Stuart D. Gathman
Avoiding the DNS Hunt, David MacQuigg
Re: Avoiding the DNS Hunt, Terry Fielder
Re: Avoiding the DNS Hunt, Stuart D. Gathman
Re: Avoiding the DNS Hunt, Stuart D. Gathman
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