On Tue, Jul 05, 2005 at 11:10:55PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
Then the final recipient, if they are strictly checking SPF, is going to
reject that genuinely forwarded mail because the mailhost which does the
forwarding _isn't_ explicitly listed as one of the valid hosts for the
original sender's domains.
Problem:
--------
A recipient mistakenly enables spf-checking for themselves without
making exceptions for their email forwarding account.
Assumption:
-----------
The forwarder hasn't (yet) implemented SRS.
Result:
-------
The recipient then loses valid mail from spf-publishing domains that
have published honest records of when and how the domain owner will take
responsibility for mailfrom's sent in their name.
Fix:
----
So the recipient realizes their mistake and makes an exception for their
non-SRS forwarder that they mistakenly didn't include.
Guess #1:
---------
I would imagine that just as ISP's have nifty web controls for
controlling other email preferences, ISP's will soon have a place for
their users to enter forwarding accounts along with the enable/disable
spf control. (As a workaround until SRS or something similar becomes
widespread.)
Guess #2:
---------
Forwarders who can advertise that they "just work" with SPF checking or
that they're otherwise spf compatible with no manual whitelisting
necessary on the part of their customersvia SRS or something else, will
suddenly have a potential marketing point to use to win them customers.
--
Mark Shewmaker
mark(_at_)primefactor(_dot_)com